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Abstract 
In the light of changing global foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns, economic research 
has started to pay an increasing amount of attention to China as one of the new main investor 
countries, and emphasize the implications of this in the world economy. This thesis examines 
Chinese FDI flows and investor behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and relates this to the 
academic debate surrounding its perceived controversy. Country-level panel data is used to 
estimate Chinese FDI flows through two different types of regressions, in order to distinguish 
what factors are significant in Chinese FDI flows to SSA. This is done in order to empirically 
analyze whether the characteristics of Chinese investor behavior in SSA differ from how 
other influential investor countries act in this region, and moreover, investigate how the 
obtained results correspond with general theories of FDI. The results of the empirical analysis 
are somewhat ambiguous. They indicate that China does follow the predictions expected from 
general FDI theory, but may have a more pronounced inclination towards the resource 
seeking type of FDI, where investments are linked mainly to host country natural resources. 
Moreover, it is found that both China and other major investors seem to be driven by market 
seeking FDI motives, attracted by the emerging markets in SSA. 
 
Keywords: FDI, China, Sub-Saharan Africa, OLI framework, gravity model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   3	  
List of Abbreviations 
CPI - Consumer Price Index 
FDI - Foreign Direct Investments 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
G7 - Group of 7 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
M&As - Mergers and Acquisitions 
MNE - Multinational Enterprise  
MOFCOM – Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLI - Ownership, Location, Internalization  
OLS - Ordinary Least Squares 
PRS - Political Risk Services group 
SSA - Sub-Saharan Africa 
UN - United Nations 
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
USD - United States Dollar 
WGI - Worldwide Governance Indicators 
WHO - World Health Organization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   4	  
Table of contents 
 
1.0 Introduction    5  
1.1 Topic and purpose  7  
1.2 Method and material  7 
1.3 Disposition  8 
 
2.0 Context and background  9 
2.1 Foreign Direct Investments  9 
2.2 FDI in Africa  11 
2.3 Chinese FDI  13 
2.4 China's presence in Sub-Saharan Africa  15 
2.4.1 Controversy and criticism  16 
2.5 Previous research  18 
 
3.0 Theoretical framework  21 
3.1 The OLI framework  21 
 
4.0 Econometric analysis  25 
4.1 Data and variables  25 
4.2 Limitations  29 
4.3 Model and method of estimation  31 
 
5.0 Results and discussion  34 
5.1.1 Results Model 1a  34 
5.1.2 Results Model 1b  35 
5.1.3 Results Model 2  37 
5.2 Robustness  38 
 
6.0 Conclusions  44 
 
7.0 Further research 48 
 
8.0 References  50 
 
9.0 Appendix  55 
 
 
	   5	  
1.0 Introduction 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) play a fundamental role in the global economy, and due to 
the consistent trend towards an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, FDI are 
predicted to stay important in the near future. One way to observe this growing importance is 
through the World Investment Reports, compiled by the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), in which data on FDI has been systematically collected since 
year 1990. Such reports provide unambiguous evidence of a global FDI trend on the rise. 
Traditionally, both inward and outward FDI flows have mainly been limited to developed 
countries, which have been investing in other developed economies. Essentially, this means 
that investments have flowed between similar countries that are well-connected and/or located 
fairly close to each other. However, in more recent times, this pattern has changed, and 
developing countries have become more and more influential in the both the patterns and 
magnitude of global FDI flows (UNCTAD, 1998, pp. 1-2; UNCTAD, 2011, p. 10; UNCTAD, 
2014a, p. ix).  
 
The general view of FDI in academia is predominantly positive, since FDI according to 
neoclassical and endogenous growth models have potential to be highly beneficial, both on a 
global level as well as within a given country (Ajayi, 2006, p. 1). This prevailing positive 
view of FDI rests on the assumption of investment as a critical requirement for growth, or 
more specifically, on FDI as a key driver for economic growth. Seen from this standpoint, 
FDI inflows will not only contribute to economic growth by providing capital for investments, 
but is also believed to contribute to improving the economic situation in host countries by 
promoting local employment and increasing the efficiency of domestic firms. The latter can 
be achieved through so called spillover effects, by knowledge and technology transfers, and 
by increased domestic competition (Ajayi, 2006, pp. 11-12). One example of an institution 
that maintains the prevalent positive perception of foreign investments is the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which explicitly states that given that the 
host country has a functioning policy framework, FDI can foster host country financial 
stability, promote economic growth, and increase overall societal well-being (OECD, 2008, p. 
3). 
 
Against the above mentioned backdrop of changing global FDI patterns, China has emerged 
as a new important actor, especially when considering its sharp and steady increase in 
	   6	  
outward FDI flows. As of 2014, China is the third largest outward investor in the world, 
following only Japan and the US (UNCTAD, 2014a, p. 7). One reason to why increased 
Chinese outward investments are seen as particularly important in the global economy is due 
to the Chinese practice of mainly investing in developing countries, as opposed to traditional 
patterns of developed-developed country FDI flows. Thus, Chinese FDI is believed to have 
considerable impacts on development, which in turn may have positive effects on poverty 
alleviation in the developing world (Cheung and Qian, 2009, p. 313). 
 
One of the regions where China has become an influential investor is in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), which is a region that previously has received very modest amounts of FDI. In fact, 
current global FDI inflows to Africa are still meager, compared to inflows into other parts of 
the developing world. One often cited reason to this is due to a widespread perception among 
investors of the SSA region as risky and unstable (Ajayi, 2006, pp. 13-14, 20; UNCTAD, 
2007, pp. 5-6). However, over the last decade China has continuously increased its overall 
investments in this region (Cheung and Qian, 2009, p. 313; UNCTAD, 2014b, p. 2; Zafar, 
2007, p. 123), something that, as described in chapter two, has attracted a lot of attention from 
various directions. This thesis aims at examining this important new component of the global 
FDI trend and composition, by both theoretically and empirically analyzing Chinese outward 
FDI directed to SSA, and thereby relate it to the perceived controversy by which it is 
surrounded, as further described in chapter two. 
 
In the empirical analysis of this thesis, Chinese investor behavior in SSA is compared to the 
behavior of other investor countries, in order to discern any differences that in turn may 
indicate if there is any truth in the accusations of unconventional and/or detrimental Chinese 
FDI practices. Two main types of regression models are used to examine Chinese FDI flows 
to SSA, and although the results are ambiguous, some evidence is found that points towards 
China being more interested in acquiring natural resources than other investor countries. 
However, the results of the regressions do not provide any evidence supporting the claim that 
Chinese investors take advantage of countries with weak institutional environments. 
Furthermore, results show that investors, both from China as well as from other countries, 
seem to be attracted to large and/or prospering host country markets, which is a trend that 
might keep on rising in line with a sustained development and enhanced growth in the 
emerging economies in SSA. 
	   7	  
1.1 Topic 
As previously mentioned, outward Chinese FDI has increased steadily over the past decades, 
and the increased FDI flows have been particularly notable in SSA—a region that by many 
have been seen as a ‘lost continent’, with no possibilities for profitable investments 
(Brautigam, 2009, p. 69; Ovadia, 2013, p. 235; Zafar, 2007, pp. 123-124). However, China’s 
increase in outward FDI in this region has not been undisputed in academic literature nor in 
mainstream Western media, and accusations of excessive resource seeking and support of 
questionable regimes are often leveled against the Chinese presence in Africa (Kolstad and 
Wiig, 2012, p. 1; van Dijk, 2009, pp. 141-144, 154-155; Zafar, 2007, p. 106). The purpose of 
this thesis is to analyze Chinese FDI in SSA, by studying Chinese FDI activities in ten 
different countries, namely Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. All of these SSA countries are recipients of 
Chinese FDI, but the extent and composition of FDI inflows differ among them. This thesis 
seeks to examine Chinese FDI behavior in SSA, to see if it differs from ‘traditional’ FDI 
behavior, as it has been modeled in economic theory and previously been practiced by other 
investor countries. To distinguish such possible differences, Chinese FDI flows are compared 
to FDI flows from other investor countries in an empirical analysis. In order to make such a 
comparison, data from the so called Group of Seven (G7) countries is used, which consist of 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Hence, 
the G7 data considers FDI flows from seven of the largest and most influential economies in 
the world. The results of this empirical analysis are then interpreted, in order to see what these 
may imply regarding Chinese FDI behavior. The empirical analysis is focused on so called 
pull factors as independent variables, i.e. domestic factors in the SSA countries that are 
believed to attract FDI, in order to perform a comparative study of Chinese versus the G7 
countries’ investment behaviors. Primarily, this thesis aims to answer the following question: 
 
• Does Chinese FDI behavior in SSA differ from the behavior of other investor 
countries? 
 
1.2 Method and material 
This thesis is based on economic theory of FDI, combined with empirical sources regarding 
both host country and investor country factors potentially affecting FDI. Additionally, in 
order to obtain a greater understanding of the topic, and to answer the research question, this 
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is complemented with the use of econometric methods, with which carefully selected 
variables are estimated to analyze Chinese flows in accordance with appropriate economic 
models. The economic theories of FDI that the analysis is based upon are briefly explained in 
chapter three, which contains the theoretical framework of this thesis. The econometric 
methods applied in the empirical analysis are explained in detail in chapter four. 
 
All material in this thesis, unless otherwise stated, is collected from scientific journals, or 
reports from governments or other leading non-government organizations such as the United 
Nations (UN) and the World Bank. This ensures a high reliability in the data, but also, well-
founded facts and arguments in the other parts of the thesis. However, the data set used in the 
econometric analysis contains some missing values. Also, due to this limitation in availability 
of complete data, the data set used in the empirical analysis spans over a relatively short 
period of time, from 2006 to 2012. It must also be noted that this time period was rather 
volatile as a result of the financial crisis that hit the world economy in 2007-2008, which lead 
to a general decrease in aggregate FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2012, p. xiii). Problems due to these 
limitations in the data set will be further discussed in chapter four. 
 
Moreover, it must be noted that the SSA countries included in the empirical analysis in the 
thesis are not randomly selected, but are chosen from criteria such as availability of data, and 
that the given country actually is a recipient of Chinese FDI. However, in order to answer the 
research question as accurately as possible, the data set is chosen to reflect the entire SSA 
region economically, culturally and geographically. The decision to use FDI flows from the 
G7 countries as a counterpart in the comparison of Chinese FDI behavior against ‘traditional’ 
FDI behavior, is due to the relatively good availability of data, but also because these 
countries can reflect investments by traditional developed nations from different parts of the 
globe—not solely reflecting the European perspective. But because of the previously 
mentioned issues, the results of the regressions in the empirical analysis might be biased, 
which in turn can affect both the interpretation as well as further implications of the findings. 
This is discussed further in chapter four. 
 
1.3 Disposition  
Chapter two provides a brief background of FDI flows to the African continent, Chinese FDI 
in general and China’s FDI in Africa. This background chapter describes the FDI concept in 
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general, followed by a description of the evolvement of FDI in the given setting of this thesis, 
from historical times up until the present day. Furthermore, this chapter includes a section that 
presents the current academic and media debates regarding the perceived controversy 
surrounding Chinese investments in Africa, followed by a section that briefly outlines the 
previous academic literature that is considered to be relevant in this given context. Chapter 
three describes the theoretical framework regarding FDI, and explains the models and terms 
that are persistently used throughout this thesis, particularly in the subsequent empirical 
analysis of factors that may affect the distribution and extent of Chinese FDI in SSA. Chapter 
four contains a description of the setup of the empirical analysis, and describes the selected 
data and regression variables. Moreover, this chapter presents the model and method of 
estimation. In chapter five, the results of the empirical analysis are presented, followed by a 
discussion of the results and their implications. This chapter also contains a comprehensive 
robustness section, in which effects of alternate approaches and other variables are discussed 
and tested. Chapter six concludes the thesis with a summary of the results together with a 
brief finishing discussion, and after this, in chapter seven, ideas that would be interesting for 
future inquires in this topic are suggested. 
            
 
2.0 Context and background 
 
2.1 Foreign direct investments 
A foreign direct investment is defined as a direct investment in a business in a host country by 
a firm from a different country. However, in order for such investments to be classified as a 
FDI, they have to be made with the objective of a longer lasting interest in the host firm, 
which suggests that the investor will have a certain degree of managerial influence in the 
other firm. By engaging in FDI, the investing company can be regarded as a multinational 
enterprise (MNE), which is defined as an enterprise that owns productive assets in more 
locations than in its own country. MNEs have grown in importance in the global economic 
system during the last few decades, and as an example of their increasing impact, figures 
show that the sales of foreign affiliates of MNEs have risen from 23,5 percent of aggregate 
world gross domestic product (GDP) in 1982, to 46 percent in 2004 (van Marrewijk, 2007, 
pp. 324-325; Neary, 2009, p. 207). 
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Figure 1: FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1995-2013 and projections, 2014-
2016 (UNCTAD, 2014a, p. xiii).  
 
Figure 1 above gives a picture of how aggregated global inflows of FDI have been increasing 
over the last two decades. Besides this aggregated increase, the traditional distribution and 
composition of these flows, in which developed countries generally have larger outflows of 
FDI, while developing countries and transition economies have been characterized by larger 
inflows, have started to change in the recent years. Nowadays, the overall trend seems to be 
moving towards a more even distribution of FDI flows, where traditional major recipients of 
FDI, for example China, simultaneously are major investors in other countries (UNCTAD, 
2014a, pp. xv, 6).     
 
The global aggregate trend of rising levels of FDI and increasing numbers of MNEs has been 
followed by an intensified focus in economic literature on finding models that explain FDI, 
and has subsequently led to various extensions and developments of traditional trade theories. 
The traditional theories have not only been extended in order to in addition explain FDI, but 
have also been complemented with new theories, that pertain to the implications of the trend 
of increasing FDI levels, and the impact this has on global trade (Dunning, 2000, pp. 163-
190). Furthermore the broad definition of FDI has been narrowed down and characterized in 
terms of motives, composition, or way of implementation. As a result of such more narrow 
classifications FDI, different conclusions and implications have been developed for each type 
of FDI, which is mirrored by the different approaches that researchers have taken to FDI in 
	   11	  
academic literature. This can also be seen in section 2.5 that describes previous FDI research 
relevant to the topic of this thesis.  
 
One frequently used approach to explain FDI in academic literature is to identify the different 
factors that influence capital flows into countries. The factors that are said to influence capital 
flows into different countries are commonly known as pull and push factors (Ajayi, 2006, p. 
23). The former consist of factors in the host country that may attract foreign firms to invest 
in that country, and the latter consist of domestic factors in the investing firms’ country that 
may induce firms to invest somewhere else, and make the decision to expand their businesses 
abroad. Both pull and push factors are contextual, and dependent on global as well as local 
outside factors. The relative importance of a given set of pull and push factors may also vary 
in different locations or countries, and may easily change due to exogenous shocks. Research 
have concluded that some of the most influential push factors are growth and interest rates in 
the investing countries, and that these push factors essentially determine the total amount of 
funds available for FDI (Ajayi, 2006, p. 15). As discussed in section 2.3, China’s rapid 
economic growth is believed to be one of the most significant push factors for Chinese 
investments. Pull factors consist of host country characteristics and policies, for example low 
price levels, lax regulations, flourishing domestic markets, economic and political stability, 
well-developed infrastructure, secure environments or well-functioning legal, educational and 
banking systems (Ajayi, 2006, p. 15; WHO, 2014). One benefit of the pull and push factor 
terminology when discussing FDI is that such factors can be assessed from a country level 
perspective, which is convenient in an analysis like the one in this thesis, that looks at FDI 
flows between different countries. Therefore, specific pull and push factors are mentioned and 
assessed in both the discussion sections and econometric parts of this thesis. The pull factors 
are particularly emphasized in the econometric analysis in chapter four, in relation to the 
variables included in the regression specifications.  
                 
2.2 FDI in Africa 
The history of FDI in Africa goes back to the modern colonial era, which began in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. During this period, an absolute majority of the African 
continent was controlled by outside powers. Although an early type of investments was made 
by the controlling nations in their colonies, these were of course different from FDI in the 
modern sense (Svedberg, 1981, pp. 21-22). Nevertheless, economists have recognized the 
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legacy of colonialism in relation to FDI, and highlighted the subsequent institutions and 
investments some of the settlements resulted in. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2001), argue 
that a colonialist legacy is likely to have affected countries’ growth and development 
processes up until the present day. Moreover, colonial links in the form of common language, 
culture, and institutions might play an important role in determining what type of investments 
a country attracts in modern times (Acemoglu et al., 2001, pp. 1369-1398; Bertocchi and 
Canova, 2002, pp. 1854-1857; Bloningen and Piger, 2011, pp. 21-24; Svedberg, 1981, pp. 36-
37). 
 
In the period following the Second World War, most African colonies managed to become 
independent. However, the early days of independence were marked by political instability 
and isolation in many of the former colonies. Following this period, many African countries 
went through significant economic liberalization programs, often as a result of structural 
adjustments aimed at securing macroeconomic stability that was part of the conditional loans 
and aid packages from institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (Griffin, 1996, p. 5). Although such imposed structural changes in many of the 
SSA countries have been critically assessed by academic scholars (Herbst, 1990, pp. 949-958; 
Mkandawire, 2005, pp. 1-33), the more recent decades have been characterized by modestly 
increasing FDI inflows to SSA, which might not only have been spurred by increased political 
stability in the region, but also by the changing nature of these countries’ economic systems 
(UNCTAD, 1998, pp. 180-181). 
 
China was never part of the colonial systems in Africa, so colonial links are hence unlikely to 
affect the extent or composition of Chinese FDI in African countries. On the other hand, the 
fact that China was not part of this system could have a certain impact on present day levels 
of Chinese FDI in SSA. Since Chinese support was essential in some SSA countries’ 
struggles for independence, the relationships that were formed during that period might affect 
today’s levels of Chinese FDI. This is further discussed in section 2.4. 
 
These days, Africa is an important area for FDI, and the region’s FDI inflows are now 
stabilized at a significantly higher level than in the beginning of the 1990s (UNCTAD, 1998, 
p. xxv). Although the levels of inward FDI flows did experience a minor drop in year 2010, 
the trend is once again on the rise. FDI inflows to Africa were recently estimated to a value of 
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57 billion USD, which is almost twice as much as in year 2010 (UNCTAD, 2012, p. 40; 
UNCTAD, 2014a, p. 38).          
    
2.3 Chinese FDI 
In line with China's rapid economic growth since the 1980s, the country has become both an 
increasing source of, as well as a recipient of FDI. During the early days of this period, China 
was primarily a recipient of inward FDI flows, but increased growth combined with 
significant government encouragement towards increased outward FDI have now changed 
this picture. Chinese outward FDI flows have traditionally been mainly directed towards Asia, 
followed by North America, Africa, and Latin America (van Dijk, 2009, p. 87; UNCTAD, 
2003, pp. 2-4). 
 
 
Figure 2: FDI inflows and outflows, top 20 host and home economies, 2012 and 2013 
(UNCTAD, 2014a, p. xv). 
 
Numerous reasons have been cited for the increased interest in outward investments from 
Chinese firms, apart from increased outward FDI being a natural consequence of the rapid 
Chinese economic growth. The following cited reasons and factors can be described as push 
factors, which are factors that induce domestic firms to invest abroad. One such factor lies in 
the relatively weak domestic demand for consumption, which has encouraged Chinese firms 
to look elsewhere for new markets, especially since this has been combined with a decreasing 
foreign demand for Chinese exports. The decreasing foreign demand itself can be attributed to 
multiple causes, for example increased competition from low wage countries in light of 
China's improved standards of living and rising wages. In addition, there are several 
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macroeconomic factors that interplay with the decrease in demand for Chinese exports. One 
such factor is the recent strengthening of the Chinese currency relative to other currencies—
something that is likely to continue, since the renminbi is widely considered to be 
undervalued (Lipman, 2011, p. 82; UNCTAD, 2003, p. 4). 
 
Furthermore, China's massive trade surplus in certain markets, primarily in the United States, 
can also explain the increased interest in outward FDI, since North America as mentioned 
above is one of China’s largest FDI recipient countries. In markets like these, FDI can 
become a channel for surplus revenue, and it may also be advantageous for Chinese firms to 
invest in local distribution networks in their FDI host countries (Cheung and Qian, 2009, p. 
325; UNCTAD, 2003 pp. 4-5). 
 
Another possible reason for Chinese firms to invest in foreign production is to avoid trade 
restrictions, or take advantage of, for example, certain African countries’ preferential trade 
agreements. An example of this can be found in the now defunct Multi Fiber Agreement, 
which limited exports of textiles from developing to developed countries. Chinese firms took 
advantage of several African countries that did not use up their assigned quotas, and 
purchased factories there, thus allowing them to bypass the restrictions set up by that 
agreement and increase their exports (van Dijk, 2009, pp. 89, 103-104; Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2009, p. 556). Hence, global trade agreements, as well as trade policy have been found to 
affect trends in Chinese FDI. 
 
Moreover, there are other, and perhaps more comprehendible reasons for Chinese firms as 
well as the Chinese government to look outwards for new markets. Access to advanced 
technology through technology transfers is obviously desirable for most firms, but this reason 
could be even more emphasized in relation to Chinese firms, since China as a whole is 
moving towards more capital intensive and more technologically advanced production. 
Another reason can be found in the increased demand for natural resources that are not in 
abundance within China, so access to resources, primarily to minerals and oil have often been 
cited as an important factor in the increase of Chinese FDI (van Dijk, 2009, p. 42). 
 
Chinese firms have also been experiencing extensive government encouragement to seek new 
markets, and more specifically to invest abroad. In 2002, Chinese authorities launched a 
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‘going global’ campaign, aimed at supporting the process of economic reform in China. This 
essentially meant that the Chinese government started to promote and facilitate Chinese firms’ 
engagement in outward FDI activities. Although Chinese outward FDI have evolved from 
consisting mainly of state-owned enterprises towards a more market oriented approach, the 
Chinese government is still heavily involved in most outward FDI activities—and in year 
2006, about 82 percent of the Chinese firms investing abroad were state-owned enterprises 
(Cheung and Qian, 2009, p. 315; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012, p. 6). 
 
The relatively high level of government involvement in Chinese outward FDI activities has 
several implications that have been widely discussed by academic scholars. One theory that 
has been put forward is that Chinese firms, due to the fact that they are deeply connected to 
the Chinese state (and hence, have access to subsidized capital) can afford investing with a 
longer-term perspective (van Dijk, 2009, p. 91; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009, p. 562). The fact 
that many of the investing Chinese firms are state-owned may also suggest that FDI decisions 
could be made with additional political motives. Such motives could be to assist domestic 
development processes, to promote Chinese foreign policy or favoring domestic elites. 
Another theory that has been put forward in relation to Chinese FDI, is that due to the 
different institutional environment in China, with its higher level of corruption and lax stock 
market regulations, the country has a competitive advantage in other countries with similar 
institutional characteristics (Kolstad and Wiig, 2012, pp. 6-7).  
 
In conclusion, China has in the recent decades emerged as an important source of FDI 
(UNCTAD, 2003, p. 2), but since China is slightly different compared to some of the other 
traditional major investor countries, some of the above mentioned push factors and features 
may affect the extent and distribution of Chinese FDI. For example, the fact that state 
ownership and institutional environments could affect FDI behavior is an important issue to 
consider in relation to China’s increased influence in global FDI flows. This is done in this 
thesis’ empirical analysis by estimating the impact of an institutional variable included in the 
regressions in chapter four. 
 
2.4 China's presence in Africa 
China's current presence in Africa goes back to the founding of the Peoples’ Republic in year 
1949. The early Sino-African contacts took place against the Cold War backdrop and the 
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ideological struggle between the East and the West, which continued after the Sino-Soviet 
split in the 1960s with China opposition against both the Soviet Union as well as the Western 
powers. During those times, China offered considerable support to several liberation 
movements in many former African colonies. This support was often a result of shared 
political beliefs and similar systems of government. Moreover, in the above mentioned Cold 
War setting, China used its trade and investment policies as a geopolitical tool, in order to 
contain and limit both Soviet and Western influence in the African continent (Taylor, 2007, p. 
23). 
 
This ideological focus in China’s activities in Africa came to an end in 1977, when the 
Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party decided to separate its Africa policy from 
its ideological orientation, and establish diplomatic relations with all of the African 
continent’s governing political entities. Hence, the Chinese presence in Africa after 1977 was 
much more focused on investments and trade, and this focus took multiple and often 
interlinking forms through Chinese policies regarding aid, trade, military cooperation, and 
FDI (van Dijk, 2009, pp. 9-10, 83; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010, pp. 861-867; Yu, 2009, pp. 9-10). 
As a result of the relatively extensive Chinese activity in post-independence Africa, both in an 
ideological sense, and through investments and trade, China is still seen by some as 
trustworthy and thus enjoys a certain level of legitimacy in many African countries 
(Brautigam, 2009, p. 310). However, one must note that the intertwined nature of China’s 
activities in Africa makes it difficult to distinguish what actually can be defined as FDI. As 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2009, p. 561) state, it is almost impossible to separate Chinese aid 
from Chinese FDI. One example of this is the so called ‘Angola model’ (described in section 
2.4.1 below), which is frequently used by Chinese firms in some SSA countries.  
 
2.4.1 Controversy and criticism 
Chinese behavior and motives for FDI, particularly in developing countries, have been 
continually questioned and widely debated. Much criticism has been voiced in Western 
mainstream media, but this critical perspective has also garnered some support in academia, 
governments, and in some of the countries receiving Chinese FDI (Ovadia, 2013, pp. 233-
234, 238, 244-245). However, there are other arguments that suggest that the motives and 
practices of Chinese FDI are no different than the ones of Western firms, and that the critical 
reactions are merely responses out of resentment towards China’s encroachment on markets 
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perceived to be under Western influence. The criticism directed against China’s FDI policies 
is subject to an intense debate and much controversy, and facts still remain uncertain. 
Therefore, this section will only briefly discuss some of the criticisms of Chinese practices in 
Africa with regards to FDI, along with some counter arguments as a response to these 
allegations (Kolstad and Wiig, 2012, pp. 1-2, 15-16). 
 
Perhaps the most common accusation regarding China’s presence in Africa concerns 
excessive resource seeking, claiming that Chinese interests are neither long term nor 
sustainable, but primarily focused on extracting natural resources in certain African countries. 
Critics have been particularly vocal regarding the oil sector, where the motives behind 
Chinese investments and aid in some oil rich countries such as Angola, Sudan and Nigeria, 
have been widely questioned (Kolstad and Wiig, 2012, pp. 4, 14-15). On the contrary, other 
researchers have found that the motives of Chinese firms in resources of the type that might 
have strategic importance to their governments are no different from Western firms and 
governments’ interests. Furthermore, according to surveys by the World Bank, an increase in 
Chinese investments has been seen in a wide range of sectors, and is not limited solely to 
natural resource sectors (van Dijk, 2009, pp. 89-90; UNCTAD, 2011, p. 11). 
 
Another accusation, often related to the one mentioned above, is that China takes advantage 
of countries suffering from political instability—countries that Western firms and other 
investors would normally avoid. In these cases, both Chinese firms and aid have been claimed 
to aggravate the situation in unstable countries, by propping up questionable regimes and 
undermining progress made in areas such as democracy, human rights et cetera. One of the 
most cited cases of such detrimental behavior is the Chinese involvement with the 
government of Sudan during the war in Darfur (van Dijk, 2009, pp. 89, 141-144; Kolstad and 
Wiig, 2012 p. 1; Tan-Mullins et al., 2010, p. 865, 876). Examples like this do indicate that 
both Chinese FDI and aid often lack political considerations regarding democracy, openness, 
human rights and so on. This in turn, could help sustain and reinforce the power of corrupt 
elites, which is something that could be unfavorable for a country’s citizens, as well as for 
that country as a whole (Ovadia, 2013, p. 246). 
 
In addition, the Chinese practice of economic ties has also been much criticized, for example 
the frequently used practice of requiring large amounts of Chinese labor or equipment in host 
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country projects. While this hardly is a unique feature of Chinese FDI, some research 
indicates that it is possible that such practices are more common in Chinese projects (Tan-
Mullins et al., 2010, pp. 876-877; Zafar, 2007, pp. 106, 124). The previous mentioned 
‘Angola model’, which is used by some Chinese investors, constitutes a straightforward 
example of Chinese FDI practices characterized by strict economic ties. This model can be 
described as a hybrid of FDI and aid, in which significantly subsidized loans can be granted 
by China to host country projects in Africa. However, these projects must be tied to the use of 
Chinese labor and inputs. An additional feature of this model is that the loan part of the 
projects can be paid back by the host country in terms of exports of natural resources, which 
is something that can be very beneficial for the investors. The perceived controversy 
regarding the ‘Angola model’ lies in the question of to which extent such arrangements can 
benefit the host country, given that most labor and inputs are external. 
 
A final concern regarding Chinese FDI is connected to the hypothesized more relaxed 
Chinese attitudes to host country political and institutional environments. Essentially, 
concerns have been raised about the possibility that SSA countries with lax labor and/or 
environmental regulations, corrupt governments, and general economic or political instability 
will not have any incentives to try to change these conditions if they still get access to capital 
through Chinese investors. This in turn could then lead to a so called ‘race to the bottom’, in 
which the prevalence of such destructive host country characteristics might even become 
higher in the competition of attracting Chinese FDI. A plausible reason to make such 
predictions is that FDI in general (especially if it is of the resource seeking type) is usually not 
attracted to sectors that contribute to sustainable economic growth, nor to sectors that promote 
an inclusive and fair development process in the host country (Ajayi, 2006, p. 12).  
 
2.5 Previous research 
The economic literature on general FDI is vast, but among the most notable names and main 
contributors are Dunning (the creator of the OLI framework), Markusen, and Brainard. Their 
general theories on FDI are described more into depth in chapter three, in the description of 
the theoretical framework used in this thesis. A well-cited paper on FDI in general is written 
by Helpman et al. (2003), in which they extend theories by the previously mentioned scholars 
in order to explain FDI, but with an intensified focus on the role of firm-level heterogeneity. 
There is also a significant body of literature that deals more specifically with FDI in certain 
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regions or setting and that attempts to examine the phenomenon theoretically and/or 
empirically in a given context.  
 
Among the papers that discuss general FDI inflows in the context of SSA, a prominent 
contribution is made by Asiedu (2002), through her examination of why SSA countries have 
received relatively less FDI compared to other developing countries. More specifically, she 
investigates the factors that affect FDI inflows to SSA, in order to see which of these factors 
that are significant in determining the inflows. In this paper, she reaches the conclusion that 
developed infrastructure and openness to trade are less significant in the context of SSA 
countries than in non-SSA countries. The first result is derived from the fact that the 
objectives of much FDI in SSA is believed to be resource seeking, and the second is believed 
to be due to a perceived view of insecurity that interferes with the effects of increased trade 
openness. Another paper by Asiedu (2006) investigates such factors even further, but this 
time in Africa as a whole, and comes to the conclusion that host country market size, levels of 
natural endowments, infrastructure, inflation, legal systems, and investment frameworks can 
positively affect FDI inflows (Asiedu, 2006, p.74). Another paper by Adams (2009) analyzes 
general FDI flows to SSA in terms of their effects on economic growth, and comes to the 
conclusion that FDI can be said to have a positive impact on growth, although it may have an 
initial, but transient, negative effect on domestic investments. 
 
Due to the focus of this thesis, previous literature on motivations driving Chinese firms to 
invest abroad is highly relevant for subsequent discussion and analysis. One example in this 
branch of FDI literature is Kolstad and Wiig’s (2012) paper on Chinese outward FDI in 
general, where they use host country pull factors that are hypothesized to attract Chinese FDI 
in an econometric analysis seeking to find the determinants of China’s overall outward FDI. 
Their main focus is on institutional and natural resource pull factors, and they come to the 
conclusion that Chinese outward FDI is drawn to host countries with large domestic markets 
when they are investing in OECD countries, and attracted to resource rich host countries with 
poor institutions when they are investing in non-OECD countries. Cheng and Ma (2007) also 
look at general Chinese outward FDI in their paper, but use a different method, as they 
estimate Chinese FDI outflows through a gravity equation. They find that host country GDP, 
cultural ties, and common borders with China are factors that spur Chinese investments, 
whereas investments decrease with distance from China. Another paper that also takes on a 
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more empirical approach in its analysis of Chinese outward FDI is a study by Cheung and 
Qian (2009), in which they use econometric methods to characterize the determining factors 
for Chinese outward FDI flows to both developed and developing countries. They find that 
Chinese FDI is driven by both market-seeking and resource-seeking motives, but find no 
evidence that China would be drawn to countries with poor institutions since the variable for 
quality of institutions is found to be insignificant. Moreover, they find that China’s large 
currency reserves promote Chinese investments, and hence serve as an influential push factor. 
 
Furthermore, there is an increasing body of literature concerning Chinese FDI in the context 
of SSA, which naturally is imperative to this thesis whose analysis takes place in that exact 
setting. Papers in this branch of FDI literature examine the phenomenon both from a broader, 
overarching perspective, as well as in more narrow terms, through specific country case 
studies. Some of the SSA country specific studies are targeting a specific issue or focusing on a 
certain industry. A first example of a paper in this branch is Ovadia’s (2013) discussion of the 
polarized debate of China’s FDI motives and practises in Angola, and another example is 
Corkin’s (2011) discussion of China’s engagement in the Angolan oil industry and of how this is 
structured. More examples of empirical country specific studies can be found in “Foreign 
Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Origins, Targets, Impact and Potential” edited by 
Ajayi (2006), in which several SSA countries are empirically analyzed by the means of 
econometric methods. In the branch of more exhaustive perspectives on China, SSA, and FDI, 
an example of a relatively well-cited paper is one by Kaplinsky and Morris (2009), in which 
they examine Chinese FDI in the entire SSA region. In their examination, the authors point 
towards several important issues regarding Chinese FDI in SSA, and discuss the implications 
of these. They conclude that SSA should be able to make the most of the opportunities arising 
from the current boom of Chinese investments by developing appropriate policies and 
negotiating beneficial technical agreements. However the authors of this paper also state that 
reliable data on Chinese investments is extremely difficult to find, which makes Chinese FDI 
in SSA a notoriously difficult subject to study empirically (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009, p. 
554). Hence, most papers on and studies of Chinese FDI in SSA are of a descriptive nature, or 
take on a policy-orientated perspective (Cheung and Qian, 2009, p. 313).  
 
This thesis takes on a slightly different approach to FDI than the above mentioned papers, 
since it is not only looking at outward flows from China, or just at inflows to SSA. The area 
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of interest in this thesis is the actual fraction of FDI inflows in ten SSA recipient countries 
that comes from Chinese investors, as the analysis aims at distinguishing if there is anything 
different or unconventional with these specific flows. This is done econometrically through an 
empirical comparison of the Chinese fraction of FDI flows against FDI flows into SSA from 
other investor countries. The results for both China and the other investors are then related to 
predictions of general FDI theories. Hence, the analysis of Chinese FDI flows to SSA is 
empirically linked to the current debate of perceived unconventional Chinese FDI behavior by 
examining both the determinants and trends of these FDI flows, as well as the implications of 
this phenomenon within its given context. Finally, as most previous research has come to 
differing conclusions about Chinese outflows as well as about SSA inflows, the analysis in 
this thesis uses two different models in order to hopefully get a more complete picture of the 
fraction of Chinese FDI flowing into SSA.   
 
3.0 Theoretical Framework  
As a foundation for the subsequent empirical analysis of Chinese FDI behavior in SSA, this 
chapter provides a description of the theoretical FDI framework often used in economic 
literature, which is also applied in this thesis. However, the academic approaches to FDI are 
numerous, so it must be noted that this chapter is only concentrated on the most frequently 
used theory, together with some of its later extensions that are believed to be relevant for the 
empirical analysis of this thesis. 
 
3.1 The OLI framework 
One of the most prevalent theories of FDI behavior is John Dunning’s eclectic paradigm of 
international production, more commonly known as the Ownership-Location-Internalization 
framework (OLI framework). This framework was developed to explain the existence MNEs, 
and has since the 1980s been the dominant paradigm in academic literature seeking to both 
explain and predict firm investment behavior. The framework seeks to explain determinants 
of the "extent, geography and industrial composition" of international production (Dunning, 
2000, p. 163), and these determining factors are divided into three different kinds of 
‘advantage’ variables—the ownership (O), location (L), and internalization (I) advantages 
(Dunning, 2001, pp. 173-176). 
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An ownership (O) advantage is defined as the competitive advantage a parent firm receives 
from owning a host country firm. Ownership advantages can include monopoly powers, 
unique resources, advanced technology or special managerial skills that make the firm more 
efficient. However, the relative importance of these different ownership advantages has 
shifted since Dunning first developed the OLI framework. Previously, firms’ ownership 
advantages were mainly reflected in their ability to organize assets for production. Nowadays, 
along with the emergence of more globalized markets, a firm’s ownership advantages are 
usually more focused towards its ability to organize and coordinate assets around the world, 
and its ability to work in conjunction with other firms globally. Furthermore, today’s 
ownership advantages contain a much more dynamic dimension, rather than the original and 
relatively static view of such advantages (Dunning, 2000, pp. 168-170). 
 
Location (L) advantages are related to the competitive advantages a parent firm can receive 
by locating itself in a specific country or region. Traditionally, location advantages have been 
highly focused on proximity to markets and immobile natural resources, but in recent decades 
this focus has shifted towards less tangible resources. Examples of such advantages are 
proximity to clusters of businesses with which a MNE might benefit from working with, or 
access to appropriate economic and social environments (Dunning, 2000, p. 177-179). 
 
Location advantages have been much studied by economists, and additional theories 
regarding locational factors have been developed. One way of characterizing L-advantages is 
as horizontal or vertical FDI, which emphasizes the way in which a given firm seeks to 
acquire host country specific advantages. Essentially, this distinction states that in vertical 
models, firms separate their activities into different stages of production located in different 
countries, while the horizontal model entails that firms replicate the same firm activity in 
different locations (Markusen and Maskus 2002, p. 694). The potential L-specific benefits 
from vertical FDI started to gain attention in economic literature in the mid 1980s, when links 
between increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, and the global economy were 
increasingly explored by economists (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). The horizontal 
approach, in which firms replicate the same production activity in various locations, 
contributes to the understanding of MNEs by offering a model that helps shed light on other 
L-specific motivations for engaging in FDI, highlighting benefits other than differences in 
factor abundance, such as access to new markets or increased market power (van Marrewijk, 
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2007, p. 326). Empirically, it has been found that a majority of firms are practicing a form of 
horizontal FDI rather than vertical (Markusen and Maskus, 2002, p. 705), but as Neary (2009, 
p. 215) points out, these concept are better for pedagogic uses rather than reflecting the real 
world picture of FDI. In practice, most firms do not fit into either model, but are more likely 
to use a mix, something that UNCTAD (1998, p. 111) has labeled “complex integration 
strategies”. 
 
A further addition to the theories regarding L-specific advantages is the so called proximity-
concentration hypothesis (Brainard, 1993a, pp. 37-40; Brainard, 1993b, pp. 2-3). Essentially, 
this hypothesis states that the decision to engage in FDI is a tradeoff between the benefits of 
closeness to customers and suppliers, and the benefits that could be made from staying in only 
one location, given that the market in that location is characterized by the features of new 
trade theory, implicating oligopoly or monopolistic competition. In other words, the 
proximity-concentration tradeoff means that a gain in one of these areas (proximity or 
concentration) entails a reduction in the gains from the other. According to Brainard (1993b, 
pp. 1-2), a firm will choose FDI over exports when transport and trade cost are substantial, 
investment barriers are low, and the gain from economies of scale on plant level is greater 
than the one at corporate level. 
 
Returning to Dunning’s original framework, internalization (I) advantages are the benefits 
that a parent firm can receive by actually investing in a host country (and thereby, receive the 
O and L advantages). Thus, potential internalization advantages determine whether a firm will 
become an MNE or not, through acquiring the above mentioned ownership and location 
advantages. In essence, the internalization advantages determine whether it is worth 
internalizing the O and L advantages, rather than outsourcing them to another firm in that 
location. Thus, if the benefits of internalization (i.e. to undertake production in the host 
country itself) exceed the entailing costs of FDI, taking all transaction costs into account, 
investing in said location will be profitable (Dunning, 2000, pp. 179-181). 
 
However, when it comes down to a single firm’s decision of FDI, the OLI framework 
maintains that conclusions will be highly contextual. The firm’s choice will be dependent on 
the political and economic environment in which the FDI decision takes place, on the nature 
of the industry in which the firm is situated, as well as on firm specific features. On firm 
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level, four main potential motives for investing abroad are commonly distinguished in 
economic literature. These are market seeking FDI, resource seeking FDI, efficiency seeking 
FDI, or strategic FDI. The first one, market seeking FDI, could be motivated by a desire to 
serve the demand of an emerging or growing market in the host country. Resource seeking 
FDI, on the other hand, is more supply oriented, and its motivations most often lie in access to 
natural resources in the host country. The third one, efficiency seeking FDI, is motivated by 
potential efficiency gains that can be made from investing in the host country. Such efficiency 
gains could be results of specialization or labor division, in accordance with classic trade 
theories. Finally, the strategic rationale for FDI is motivated by a desire by firms to improve 
their advantages or position vis-à-vis their competitors (Dunning, 2000, pp. 164-165). 
 
Although the OLI framework is still seen as the dominant paradigm in trying to explain the 
extent and structure of MNEs, it does not provide a general, ‘one size fits all’ model for 
explaining FDI. First of all, a lot has changed in terms of business environments since the 
theory was first developed, especially due to technological developments that have made it 
easier for parent firms to internalize firms in host countries (Henley et al., 2008, p. 3). 
Moreover, the framework can be claimed to be outdated in the sense that it does not capture 
dynamic dimensions or the importance of less tangible resources, such as business alliances 
(Dunning, 2002, p. 184). Further, while the L-specific advantages include economies of scale, 
the framework does not fully take into account agglomeration benefits outside of returns to 
scale, i.e. advantages from proximity to other similar firms such as spillovers and availability 
of specialized labor and inputs. Agglomeration effects are also thought to be an important 
determinant for FDI decisions, since investors are likely to follow previous investments, e.g. 
if a country already has a sizeable presence in a host country, other investors are likely to 
invest there, since it is easier to learn from, and do business with, already established and 
familiar firms (Ajayi, 2006, p. 18; Cheung and Qian, 2009, p. 329; Head et al., 1995, pp. 242-
243). Some scholars have suggested adding another L to the OLI framework, representing 
linkage advantages, as a response to the emergence of the so called Asian Tiger economies. 
Such advantages comes when a firm invests in another host country in order to enhance their 
own skills by learning from the host country, and that learning motive is believed by some 
scholars to be of importance in the strive to fully understand and explain FDI (Kaplinsky and 
Morris, 2009, p. 562). Finally, since the OLI framework was originally developed from 
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managerial literature (Brainard, 1993b, p. 3), it could be more suitable for explaining firm 
level decisions of FDI, rather than explaining country aggregate levels. 
 
Nevertheless, the OLI framework will be an important foundation for this thesis, as the 
subsequent empirical analysis will originate from the advantage categories in this framework. 
In the subsequent parts of this thesis, especially in section 4.1 where the regression variables 
are presented and further described, the OLI framework is be used in order to assure that each 
included variable is appropriate for an accurate analysis of FDI, by making sure that all the 
selected variables can be fitted into one of the three different OLI advantage categories. 
 
4.0 Empirical analysis 
Following chapter begins with a description of the data, variables, and models used in the 
empirical analysis of Chinese FDI behavior in SSA. The results from the regressions are then 
presented and interpreted in next chapter. In section 4.1 the data set is thoroughly described 
and all variables in the model that seeks to explain FDI flows are presented and related to the 
theories described in the theoretical framework of this thesis. Thereby, reasons as to why the 
selected variables are relevant are provided. After this, section 4.2 provides a discussion of 
the limitations in the data set. Finally, in section 4.3, the models and methods of estimation 
are further explained. This section describes the regression models, called Model 1a, Model 
1b, and Model 2, and explains the reasons why these models were chosen for the analysis in 
this thesis. 
 
4.1 Data and variables 
The regressions of the models in section 4.3 are performed on panel data that spans from 
2006-2012, from the ten different SSA countries, China, and the G7 countries. All of the 
variables that are expressed in monetary values are adjusted in current USD to compensate for 
inflation, and thus avoid biased results in the regressions. As previously mentioned the ten 
SSA countries are Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The G7 consist of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 
 
All of the independent variables in the regressions are in academic literature and in official 
reports commonly labeled as pull factors, i.e. host country specific factors that help attracting 
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FDI. In addition to being pull-factors, all these variables are in this section also related to the 
OLI framework and to the different motives for FDI that are frequently cited in both 
theoretical and empirical literature on FDI, as described in chapter three. Thus, the presence 
of all independent variables in the regressions in this thesis is thereby justified both in terms 
of the OLI framework and by what is common practice in empirical literature—which is also 
the reason to why it was decided that the empirical analysis should focus on this particular set 
of variables. Table 1.0 below gives an overview of the variables, and specifies which data 
sources they are collected from.  
 
Table 1.0: Regression variables 
 
 
 
INVESTOR COUNTRY FDI FLOWS TO HOST COUNTRY 
The dependent variable in the regressions is bilateral FDI flows to the different SSA countries 
from China and the G7 countries respectively. In Model 1a and 1b, two regressions are 
performed, using G7 outward FDI and Chinese outward FDI to the SSA countries 
respectively as dependent variables. In Model 2 using a gravity model setup (see section 4.3), 
one regression is performed, and the dependent variable is outward FDI flows from China and 
from the G7 countries. 
 
HOST COUNTRY GDP 
The variable Host country GDP is used as a proxy for market size in the regressions. This 
variable can serve as a good indicator of market seeking behavior from investors, something 
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that is described in the theoretical framework as when the investing country is driven and 
motivated by host country domestic demand. The Host country GDP variable is used by 
scholars such as Kolstad and Wiig (2012) and Cheng and Ma (2007) in their empirical 
analyses. A significant positive result in this variable may indicate that the investor country is 
motivated by access or proximity to large and/or prospering markets.  
 
In terms of the OLI framework, host country GDP could also be a possible indicator of a firm 
level focus on horizontal FDI, since the L-advantage of proximity to markets in order to avoid 
trade costs is a reason why firms choose to become MNEs, as established in section 3.1. Since 
a majority of world MNEs are horizontally organized, the Host country GDP-variable should 
be important in explaining FDI flows. However, as also established in section 3.1, it is rarely 
the case of either vertical or horizontal organization on the single firm level, but rather a 
combination, so called ‘complex integration strategies’.  
 
This variable is also linked to the ‘proximity-concentration tradeoff’, also found in section 
3.1, since the value of proximity to markets also depends on the domestic demand in these 
markets. Hence, according to this hypothesis, concentration should be less attractive the 
higher the value of this variable is, and more firms should then want to engage in FDI. 
However, it must be noted that the actual value of the proximity to markets L-advantage also 
depends on the purchasing power in said markets, which in turn is more appropriately 
represented by the next independent variable, GDP per capita. 
 
HOST COUNTRY GDP PER CAPITA 
The variable GDP per capita is used as a proxy for host country wage level in the regressions, 
and is used by Cheng and Ma (2007) in their empirical analysis of Chinese FDI. A positive 
value of this variable would indicate that the investor country is driven by efficiency seeking 
motives, originating from capital-intensive production or a general higher level of 
development. A negative value on the other hand, would indicate that the investor is attracted 
by low host country wages and cheap inputs in production.  
 
In terms of the OLI framework, this variable could also be an L-advantage indicator of 
vertical FDI organization on the firm level. This can be linked to the pattern of firms that seek 
lower labor costs are being attracted to locations with a low GDP per capita, while firms that 
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seek skilled labor or more capital intensive production should be attracted to higher GDP per 
capita.  
 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
The variable Natural resources, or more specifically natural resource rents as a percentage of 
GDP, is used as a proxy for the level of host country natural resources. Kolstad and Wiig 
(2012) are examples of scholars that use this variable for analyzing Chinese FDI. The variable 
is constructed as an aggregate measure of rents from oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, and 
forests. The Natural resource variable can be used as an indicator of investor country resource 
seeking behavior, and a significant positive value would indicate that the investor country has 
an interest in access to host country natural resources.  
 
In terms of the OLI framework, the natural resource variable is a typical L-advantage, as it 
consists of immobile country specific assets. In addition, and especially for non-renewable 
resources such as oil, a positive result could also indicate investor country strategic FDI 
motives, in order to protect or augment existing O-advantages, or to reduce the influence of 
possible competitors. However, as strategic FDI motives are found in more firm specific 
contexts, and are difficult to test for, the variable Natural resources is in this thesis seen 
primarily as an indicator of resource seeking motives. 
 
LAW 
The variable Law is used as a proxy for quality of institutions in the regressions, and is based 
on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) composed by the World Bank Group. The 
WGI indicators measure six dimensions of governance, which are voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulator quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption. In the regressions in this thesis, the rule of law index was used, 
which measures the degree to which one can feel safe with a country’s institutions, and that 
includes property rights, enforcement of contracts, police, and court systems (Kolstad and 
Wiig, 2012, p. 10). These indicators incorporate a multitude of surveys to produce an 
aggregate index, ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values reflecting better institutions in 
given country. Thus, the Law variable is used as an indicator of the host countries’ quality of 
institutions, as well as their absence of corruption, ease of doing business, and general 
openness of the economy. The Law variable thereby reflects the in academic literature 
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hypothesized importance of institutions in the host countries for attracting FDI, as well as the 
positive relationship between FDI and host country institutions that has been found in 
empirical research (Kolstad and Wiig, 2012, p. 6). The rule of law index used in this thesis 
was chosen due to its relatively high degree of coverage, compared with for example the 
Political Risk Services group (PRS) index, which is another commonly used index for these 
types of institutional variables (Kolstad and Wiig, 2012, p. 10). The Law variable built on the 
rule of law index has previously been used by scholars such as Kolstad and Wiig (2012) and 
Asiedu (2006). 
 
In terms of the OLI framework, quality of institutions belongs to the L-advantage category. 
However, this is one of the more questioned L-advantages (and likewise, one of the more 
disputed pull factors) due to the belief that bad institutions and/or lax regulations may actually 
attract more FDI from some investors, for example from Chinese investors according to some 
critics (see discussion in section 2.4.1). This is something that makes the interpretation of the 
values of this variable interesting, but also ambiguous. However, a significant result for this 
variable could indicate that the investor country does care about institutional quality, whereas 
a non-significant result indicates that the investor does not care about the quality of 
institutions in the host country. 
 
4.2 Limitations 
As pointed out in section 1.2, there are limitations in the data set both due to missing values, 
and as a result of the time period chosen. The issues related to missing data could have 
implications on both the dependent and independent variables in the regressions performed in 
this thesis, even though efforts have been made to minimize any effects on the included 
variables (Verbeek, 2012, pp. 50-52). The issues related to the time period that the analysis 
spans over are exogenous, but must nevertheless be mentioned. Also, in Model 1b when an 
interaction variable is added to the first regression specification, issues of multicollinearity 
may arise and come to affect the analysis, as discussed in section 5.1.2 (Verbeek, 2012, pp. 
43-46). 
 
In the regressions in this thesis, FDI outflows from China and from G7 directed to SSA are 
used as dependent variables. Thus, the limitation of available official data on investor 
countries’ FDI flows to SSA was a concern in the construction of the models. But by using 
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the G7 countries, which have relatively complete data on FDI flows, as counterpart group to 
compare Chinese FDI against, the amount of missing data for those dependent variables could 
be sufficiently reduced. Limited availability of data was not an issue for the dependent 
variable based on Chinese FDI flows, since the Chinese data set on FDI is complete and does 
not contain any missing values. However, it must be noted that data on Chinese investments 
might be deceptive since China’s official data only consists of approved FDI flows, not 
realized, and is therefore believed to underestimate actual FDI flows (Cheung and Qian, 2009, 
pp. 318-319). In this thesis, the official numbers from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) are used, since these are the numbers that the UNCTAD FDI database is based 
upon, so, even though there are no missing values in the Chinese data set, that dependent 
variable might not reveal the actual extent of Chinese FDI in SSA. One last thing to note in 
relation to Chinese official data, is that China has been publishing its official data according 
to the IMF and OECD standards since year 2003. Thus, the G7 and Chinese data used in this 
analysis can be compared with one another in a feasible way (Cheung and Qian, 2009, p. 
318). 
 
However, moving on to the independent variables built on SSA country specific values, the 
data is relatively incomplete in some cases. Thus, this part of the data set does contain a 
certain quantity of missing values, which may affect the results of the regressions. Another 
implication of the limitations in available data in SSA that must be mentioned is that the 
chosen SSA countries in the empirical analysis could not be randomly selected. This is due to 
the fact some SSA countries simply are not possible to use in regressions like these, due to 
lack of data. Regardless of that reason, this fact may still affect the subsequent analysis. 
 
The other issue that causes concerns for the empirical analysis is related to the selected period 
of time. Between 2006 and 2012, the global economy did experience a large shock due to the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. The crisis had a negative impact on the overall trend in FDI 
flows, which is something that consequently affects the analysis in this thesis (UNCTAD, 
2012, pp. xiii, 4). Hence, FDI flows from both China and the G7 countries may have looked 
different in absence of such a major external shock, and so could the results of the analysis. 
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4.3 Model and method of estimation 
As previously mentioned, each independent variable used in the regressions consists of a 
factor that is commonly labeled as a pull factor, which are factors that are believed to attract 
foreign investors into the host country. Through the regressions presented in this section, it 
can be distinguished which of these pull factors that are significant for the Chinese investors 
in determining of their FDI flows to the host countries.  
 
First, an ordinary least squares (OLS) model labeled Model 1a is used to perform two 
regressions, one for China’s FDI and one for the G7 countries’ FDI. Similar methods of 
running OLS regressions and comparing their results in order to examine FDI have been used 
by scholars such as Cheung and Qian (2009), and Kolstad and Wiig (2012). Model 1a is then 
extended with an interaction variable between Natural resources and Law added to the 
specification. This extended model is called Model 1b.  
 
After this, a so called gravity model is applied as a second econometric approach to 
explaining Chinese FDI. This is done through the regression labeled Model 2, which is in line 
with the approach used by Cheng and Ma (2007). The gravity model is an economic model 
initially used by economists to explain trade flows, but that more recently has been developed 
in order to try to explain more complicated FDI flows. Originally inspired by an area 
completely unrelated to economics, this economic model was constructed in the 1960s as an 
analogy of Newton's law of gravity (Anderson, 2010, p. 2). The economic version of the 
gravity model predicts that, all other things equal, the level of trade between two different 
countries will increase with the size of their economies, but decrease with the distance 
between them (Krugman et al., 2012, pp. 41-43). In order to estimate a general two-country 
gravity model, the following equation can be used: 𝑇!" = 𝐶 ∗ 𝑌!! ∗ 𝑌!!/𝐷!"!  where Tij is the 
value of the trade between the two different countries represented by the subscripts i and j, C 
is a constant, Y is the GDP of a given country, and D is the distance between the countries. 
Simply by looking at this general equation, it is clear that the gravity model predicts that the 
trade volume between two given countries will be depend positively on the size of their GDP, 
and that the distance between them will have a negative impact on their trade volume.  
 
When applying a gravity model to FDI, it has been shown that it can do a reasonably good job 
of explaining cross-country data on FDI (Bloningen, 2005, p. 393), and some scholars have 
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been successful in explaining patterns of FDI by the use of such a model (Anderson, 2010, pp. 
35-37). The gravity model in this thesis, Model 2, can essentially be seen as a way of 
extending the first OLS models, in order to see if the gravity variables for distance and 
investor country GDP may have any additional influence on Chinese FDI flows when these 
variables are estimated together with the other pull factor variables, previously used in Model 
1a and 1b. 
 
The reason for using these two different models, both Model 1 in which the separate results 
for China and G7 are compared, and Model 2 that follows a gravity model equation approach, 
is to provide more robustness in the interpretation of the results. Especially in light of the fact 
that previous researchers have reached differing conclusions depending on method of 
estimation. Further, the gravity model, while perhaps a more common approach in FDI related 
research in general, was in this particular case restricted due to a lack of specific FDI data on 
inflows to SSA from the G7 countries, which was why the two model approach was believed 
to be helpful in order to obtain reliable results. Lack of data might also be the reason to why 
previous inquiries in this topic also have applied other models than the gravity model. 
 
The regression models used in this thesis look as follows: 
 
MODEL 1a:  
 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑁𝐹𝐷𝐼!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐴𝑊 + 𝑌∗ + 𝜀!,! 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺7𝐹𝐷𝐼!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐴𝑊 + 𝑌∗ + 𝜀!,! 
 
 
MODEL 1b (EXTENDED VERSION OF MODEL 1a):  
 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑁𝐹𝐷𝐼!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐴𝑊+ 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆!,! + 𝑌∗ + 𝜀!,! 
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𝑙𝑛𝐺7𝐹𝐷𝐼!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐴𝑊+ 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐴𝑊𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆!,! + 𝑌∗ + 𝜀!,! 
 
MODEL 2  (GRAVITY MODEL): 
 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝐷𝐼!,! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑉!,! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆!,!+ 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇!,! + 𝛽!𝐿𝐴𝑊!,! + 𝑌∗ + 𝛽!𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + 𝛽!𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑉 + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑙𝑛𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽!!𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝐿𝐴𝑊+ 𝛽!"𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐻𝑂𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴 + 𝜀!,! 
 
 
All values in these models, except for Law variable built on the rule of law index have been 
transformed into logarithmic values, which mean that the results of the regressions can be 
interpreted as percentage changes (Verbeek, 2012, pp. 58-62). The Y* variable represents a 
set of year dummies that are used to eliminate year specific effects, and 
Huber/White/Sandwich adjusted standard errors are applied to eliminate possible 
heteroskedasticity issues. In Model 2, only one regression is performed in which a dummy 
representing Chinese FDI has been used to be able to single out the result for China. This 
dummy variable is then interacted with the different explanatory variables to single out 
potential differences in Chinese FDI behavior.  
 
Since two different models are used, whereas one of them is also further extended by the 
addition of an interaction variable, differences in fit it may matter when interpreting the 
results, i.e. how well the data fits the model (Verbeek, 2012, pp. 20-22). In Model 1a, the r2 is 
0,608 for Chinese FDI as dependent variable, and 0,422 for G7 FDI, which means that about 
60 and 40 percent respectively of the variation in FDI is explained by that model. When an 
interaction variable is added in Model 1b, the r2 rises slightly to 0,656 and 0,423 for China 
and G7 respectively, which means that the fit is marginally better in Model 1b when the 
interaction variable is added. In Model 2, the gravity model, the r2 is 0,486, which means this 
model has roughly the same explanatory power as Model 1a and 1b. 
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5.0 Results and discussion 
 
5.1.1 Results Model 1a 
 
(See further details in Appendix 9.1) 
 
Host country GDP (lnGDPHOST): the variable Host country GDP is significant on a one 
percent level for both investors. This means that both Chinese and G7 country investors are 
more prone to invest the larger the host country market is, which in turn suggests that both 
investors could be driven by a degree of market seeking FDI motives in the SSA region. 
Furthermore, since the value for the Host country GDP variable is higher for the G7 countries 
than for China, this could mean that the G7 country investors are more driven by market 
seeking motives than Chinese investors. 
 
Host country GDP per capita (lnGDPCAPITA): the variable Host country GDP per capita 
is significant for the G7 country investors, which indicates that wage levels in the host 
countries affect FDI decisions in SSA. These results suggest that the G7 countries are more 
interested in skilled labor or more capital-intensive production, while this does not affect the 
FDI decisions of Chinese firms.  
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Natural resources (lnNATRES): the variable Natural resources is only significant for China. 
Since the variable has a positive value, it indicates that Chinese investors would be more 
prone to invest the more abundant the host country is in natural resources such as fuels, ores, 
and minerals. Thus, this result suggests that Chinese investors could be driven by resource 
seeking FDI motives, and hence, are more attracted to accessing host country natural 
resources than G7 country investors. 
 
Law (LAW): the variable Law is not significant for either investor. This suggests that the 
quality of institutions in the host countries does not affect FDI decisions, and hence, that 
neither good nor bad institutions have effects on FDI flows. It must be noted that the values of 
the Rule of law-index in the selected SSA countries are very low in general, and not seldom 
negative. Therefore, the fact that the Law variable is not significant for either China or G7 
suggests that investors do not let the general poor quality of institutions in these SSA 
countries affect their FDI decisions. Furthermore, the non-significance also indicates that 
Chinese firms would not be more attracted to invest in countries with bad or corrupt 
institutions than other investors are, which contravenes one of the more often cited arguments 
in the debate surrounding Chinese FDI in SSA.  
 
5.1.2 Results Model 1b 
A concern mentioned in section 2.3 and 2.4.1 is connected to China’s investments in countries 
with a lower quality of institutions, and a perceived Chinese business advantage in such 
informal environments. Kolstad and Wiig (2012) further suggest that to properly take this 
concern into account, not only natural resources and institutions have to be included in 
regressions on Chinese FDI, but also the interaction effect between quality of institutions and 
natural resources. After running Model 1b, where an interaction variable between institutions 
and natural resources is added to the previous specification of Model 1a, the results show the 
following:  
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(See further details in Appendix 9.2) 
 
As can be seen, the results of Model 1b show no major differences in significance for the G7 
investors, but in China’s case, the variables Law and the interaction variable Lawnatres have 
now become significant. The Law variable is negative, and keeping in mind that the 
institutions index rule of law runs from a negative to a positive 2.5, this indicates that Chinese 
FDI is drawn to countries with bad institutions, and discouraged by good institutions. The 
interaction variable however is positive, which would indicate that Chinese FDI is drawn to 
natural resources in countries with good institutions, and discouraged by natural resources in 
countries with bad institutions. This result is inconsistent with the idea of China exploiting 
countries with bad institutions to acquire natural resources. Further, it is not in line with the 
results of Kolstad and Wiig (2012), who find evidence of this idea. The difference might be 
explained by the fact that they use a different, earlier, time period, suffer from less 
multicollinearity issues, and use a different index for natural resources (Kolstad and Wiig, 
2012, pp. 11, 13-15). However, it should be mentioned that Model 1b causes concerns due to 
possible multicollinearity problems between the interaction variable and the variables from 
which it is created, something that is important to note when interpreting the results 
(Appendix 9.3). 
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5.1.3 Results Model 2: 
 
 
(See further details in Appendix 9.4) 
 
As can be seen from the results of Model 2, none of the China specific variables are 
significant, except for the GDP of investor variable, i.e. China’s GDP. This suggests that 
China may be even more driven by GDP growth than other countries to invest abroad, which 
is a plausible indication due to its high growth rate, as discussed in section 2.1. Contrary to 
the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model, size of investor GDP appears to be 
negatively correlated to FDI in this regression, while distance appears positive. Thus, 
interpreting this result is difficult, since it does not seem intuitive that distance to host country 
should increase FDI while economic size of the investor should decrease it. However, as 
pointed out in the theoretical framework, it has been speculated that investments abroad are 
now cheaper and easier by virtue of technological advances in communications and 
transports, which could provide a sufficient explanation for the results regarding distance. 
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Another possible explanation is bias in the data, since the two largest investors in the sample, 
China and the US, are also among those farthest away, which might produce an unwarranted 
link between increasing distance and increasing FDI. The China specific variables appear to 
follow the predicted gravity model results, which in turn might indicate that Chinese FDI 
behavior is different to the G7 behavior, and perhaps more similar to prior FDI practices, 
whereas the G7 countries have changed their FDI behavior. The gravity specific variables 
aside, this regression shows that natural resources and GDP, as well as GDP per capita of the 
recipient country are positively related to FDI. To conclude, according to this model, there is 
no difference between Chinese and G7 country FDI behavior, except for the fact that Chinese 
FDI increases with Chinese GDP, while G7 countries decrease their FDI as their GDP 
increase. 
 
Finally, just as in Model 1b where a regression using the interaction term between natural 
resources and the institution index variable Law is tested, this approach was tested for Model 
2 as well. This term is then interacted with a China dummy, and while the interaction 
variables are insignificant for FDI in general, it proved significant and positive for Chinese 
FDI, and further, just as in section 5.1.2, the variable Law turned significant and positive for 
China. However, as discussed in section 5.1.2, issues with multicollinearity arise with this 
type of interacted variables, which might make interpretations difficult (Appendix 9.5 and 
9.6). 
 
5.2 Robustness 
As an alternative to the institutional index used in the regressions for the variable Law, there 
are a number of similar indices that could have been used, for example the PRS index 
mentioned in section 4.1. The PRS index does however lack data, especially for recent years, 
which is why the WGI index was chosen over the PRS index in this thesis. Furthermore, there 
are other alternatives that could be used as variables instead of indices for quality of 
institutions, judicial environment, and openness in the economy, since these institutional 
indices often are composed of a variety of data sources and surveys that are vulnerable to 
bias. One such alternative variable could be trade, defined as imports and exports as a 
percentage of GDP. Trade as a variable would then indicate openness in the economy to 
foreign goods and services and international contacts for exports. It could also proxy for ease 
of doing business, because a high amount of exports and imports indicates a better business 
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climate for foreign investors to operate in. Hence, the variable trade could also capture effects 
of global trade agreements and trade policies (following the discussion in section 2.3). 
Replacing the institution variable Law with a variable for trade does not significantly change 
the results for the G7 countries. However, in China’s case the trade variable is positive and 
significant (as opposed to the Law variable in the original specification), indicating that 
increased trade relative to GDP will attract more Chinese FDI (Appendix 9.5 and 9.6; Cheung 
and Qian, 2009, p. 325; Kolstad and Wiig, 2012, p. 11). The variable for trade is obviously 
different from our institutional rule of law index, and does not directly take into account such 
things as quality of the judicial system or corruption in the same way, which affects its 
interpretation. However, a trade variable might more accurately reflect the interests of 
investors regarding FDI, which is why it is interesting to control for. Also, when the 
interaction between trade and natural resources is tested for, in a similar way to the interaction 
between institutions and natural resources discussed in section 5.1.2, the results are the same 
for the G7 investors. For China however, the interacted variable is now negative, while the 
trade variable is positive. This indicates that Chinese FDI is drawn to natural resources in 
countries that are not very open to trade, but also that openness to trade in general increases 
Chinese FDI in said country (Appendix 9.8). 
 
Another alternative to one of the variables in the regression specifications is to, instead of 
using total natural resource rents for the variable Natural resources, use metal/ore exports 
and/or fuel exports as percentages of total exports. This could be a more appropriate proxy, in 
the sense that the amounts of resources actually exported might be more interesting to a 
foreign investor. On the other hand, exports might also be less important to foreign investors 
since already exported resources should matter less than total existing resource rents including 
non-exports which can potentially be channeled into new exports. Indices for exports rather 
than total natural resource rents were used by Kolstad and Wiig (2012) as well as Cheung and 
Qian (2009), but neither of them tests alternative indices for natural resources. Also, the 
different export indices lacked data for several countries, most notably for the major oil 
exporting country Angola, and such missing data is likely to produce skewed results. 
 
An alternative to the variable GDP per capita could have been to use actual wage data for 
each of the SSA countries, but such data is lacking for several SSA countries. Further, one 
possible disadvantage of using actual wage data might be if informal economies present in the 
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set of SSA countries are large, which would mean that official wage data is not accurate 
(Chen, 2005, pp. 5-6). In that case, host country wage levels are thus more appropriately 
proxied by GDP per capita data. Moreover, since Chinese firms have been known to import 
labor from China, host country wage levels might not be affecting Chinese firms’ FDI 
decisions anyways, at least not as much as for other investor countries (Zafar, 2007, p. 106). 
Thus, if there is truth in the claim of large quantities of the labor being imported from China, 
neither actual wage levels nor the proxy in form of GDP should be relevant for Chinese FDI 
in the regression. 
 
Other alternatives for proxying development levels, such as infrastructure variables, could 
also be appropriate to use in regressions like the ones in this thesis. Asiedu (2002; 2006) as 
well as Kolstad and Wiig (2012) include phone usage as a proxy for infrastructure. This 
measurement is advantageous due to the availability of reliable data compared to other 
existing measurements of infrastructure such as roads, which normally is difficult to measure 
accurately. When a variable based on cell phone subscriptions per 100 people was included in 
the regressions, it showed positive significance for the G7 country investors, but no 
significance for China, while the other results remained robust. The results also remained 
robust when it was used together with the extended specification in Model 1b, except for 
minor changes in significance levels. It was also significant and positive in Model 2, but when 
this new variable was interacted with a dummy for Chinese FDI, the result was insignificant 
(Appendix 9.9 and 9.10; Asiedu, 2002, pp. 111, 115; Asiedu, 2006, pp. 68-69; Kolstad and 
Wiig, 2012 p. 14)  
 
Something that was mentioned in section 2.3, is that Chinese FDI may be explained as 
serving as a channel for the country’s trade balance surplus, since a large surplus is believed 
to be an influential push factor for Chinese investors to seek investments abroad. This 
explanation might be plausible considering the fact that China already has large reserves of 
currency, especially compared to other investor countries. In order to see if this may affect 
FDI flows in the context of this analysis, a variable indicating currency reserves was added. 
This showed that the results for the original variables remain the same for China as in Model 
1a, but the variable for reserves was significant and positive, indicating that increased 
reserves increases Chinese FDI. On the contrary, the variable was significant and negative for 
the G7 countries, indicating that increased reserves decrease FDI. The results were also robust 
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when the extended specification from Model 1b was included (Appendix 9.11 and 9.12; 
Cheung and Qian, 2009, pp. 312, 327). 
 
Another issue that could be relevant to consider in the regression specifications of this thesis 
is to control for influence of ‘cultural’ factors, especially in light of Africa’s colonial heritage 
as mentioned in section 2.2. However, this is difficult to adequately test for. Kolstad and Wiig 
(2012) control for such ‘cultural factors’ with a variable for the relative amount of ethnic 
Chinese in the population, but their results are found to be insignificant. For the analysis in 
this thesis, lack of accurate data regarding ethnicities, as well as the general ambiguity of 
concepts such as ethnicity, would most likely lead to biased results, or at least results that are 
difficult to interpret (Kolstad and Wiig, 2012, p. 12). Closely related to cultural factors are 
potential effects of language, which is something that Cheng and Ma (2007, pp. 10-11) 
control for in their regressions. This makes sense in their setting, since they examine Chinese 
outward FDI flows to different parts of the world, including Chinese-speaking areas such as 
Hong Kong and Macao. Hence, they can capture the effect of common culture, languages, and 
other bilateral bonds through such a language variable. In the setting of this thesis, a language 
variable does not change much in the case of Chinese FDI. However, language could be 
affecting FDI flows from some of the G7 countries, particularly from the United Kingdom or 
English speaking countries, since many of the SSA countries in the sample are former British 
colonies. Hence, language effects, together with ‘cultural ties’ may bias the results for some 
countries.  
 
Inflation is another issue that can be considered when estimating FDI flows, which is 
something that Kolstad and Wiig (2012) control for in their regression. An inflation variable 
can in addition serve as a proxy for general macroeconomic stability. When an inflation 
variable derived from host country CPI was included to the regression specifications in this 
thesis, this variable was not significant for neither China or for the G7 countries, and all other 
results stayed robust. However, when an inflation variable derived from a host country GDP 
deflator was included, this variable turned out to be significant and negative for China, at the 
same time as all other results stayed robust. For G7, this inflation variable was not significant. 
Hence, host country inflation may have an impact on Chinese FDI behavior, although its 
inclusion does not change any of the other previous results. When included in the extended 
specification in Model 1b, the results remained similar and robust, with the exception of a loss 
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of significance in the Law variable for China when the CPI variable was included, and a 
minor gain in significance for GDP per capita for China when the GDP deflator variable was 
included. Finally, for the gravity model approach in Model 2, inflation variables based on 
GDP deflators or CPI were not significant, and they did not either change the results of the 
regression with one exception of the natural resource variable which lost some significance 
when the CPI inflation variable was included (Appendix 9.13, 9.14, 9.15 and 9.16)  
 
Agglomeration effects are an additional thing that could be considered in the, since it might 
not be realistic to assume that bilateral FDI decisions are made independent of existing FDI 
(Blonigen, 2005, p. 397). Agglomeration economies are likely to be an important determinant 
of FDI, since closeness to already realized investments might be an important L-advantage, 
resulting from for example from increasing returns to scale, availability of skilled labor, and 
resources. Cheung and Qian (2009) incorporate effects of agglomeration economies in their 
regression specification as a ratio of FDI in the host country to that years’ total outward FDI 
from the investor country. When this variable was included in Model 1a, the agglomeration 
variable was highly correlated with the dependent variable for China, resulting in non-
interpretable results. For the G7 countries however, the variable was significant and positive, 
but the variable for GDP per capita lost significance. These results remain the same when 
included in the extended specification in Model 1b. Finally, similar results where found when 
this variable was included in Model 2, where it resulted in a general loss in significance, and 
non-interpretable results for all the interacted China variables. However, if a better proxy for 
agglomeration effects were to be found, i.e. one that explains agglomeration effects without 
being correlated with the dependent variable, an agglomeration variable could perhaps be 
used in the regression specification and produce interpretable results (Appendix 9.17, 9.18, 
9.19 and 9.20). 
 
An alternative approach in the construction of the models related to issues of time would be to 
use lagged variables in the regressions. This is theoretically plausible, since factors affecting 
FDI probably will not affect the FDI flows instantly, but rather with a certain delay. However, 
it must be noted that it is difficult to determine the ‘best’ length of lags added to the 
specification. Tests using this approach with both one and two year lags on the dependent 
variables show limited results. In Model 1a, the only significant difference with one-year lags 
is that the variable for natural resources is no longer significant for Chinese FDI, nor the 
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variable GDP per capita for G7 FDI. Using two-year lags entailed even larger significance 
losses. Using lagged variables for Model 1b, the result remained robust for one-year lags, 
while two-year lags once again resulted mainly in losses in significance. (Appendix 9.21, 
9.22, 9.23 and 9.24). One and two year lags have also been tested on the gravity model 
approach in Model 2, but this did not result in any difference in significance levels for the 
China specific variables, and only minor differences in the explanatory variables in general, 
with a few previously significant variables becoming insignificant as the size of the lags 
increased (Appendix 9.25 and 9.26).  
 
Another method for capturing time effects is to use the averages of FDI for a period of time. 
Kolstad and Wiig (2012) do this in their regressions by using the average of the period 2000-
2002 as the explanatory variable for FDI in the period 2003-2006. They motivate this by 
referring to other studies which smooth out FDI flows with period averages, and argue that 
this method is better than a panel approach with limited data. However, tests using this 
method on Model 1a, using averages for 2007-2009 as explanatory variables for FDI flows in 
2010-2012, showed few significant results for Chinese FDI, and none for the G7 countries. 
This is likely to be due to the limited number of observations when using averages over such 
short time periods, which is also the largest issue with this approach (Appendix 9.27; Kolstad 
and Wiig 2012, p. 12, 18). 
 
Further, to assure that all of the different interacted variables in Model 2 are plausible, 
regressions including individual or pairs of dummy variables were tested. The results of this 
were varying, in general only resulting in small changes in the significance levels of the 
variables for GDP per capita and distance when including just one of the interaction variables 
in the regression. Further, the China specific dummy variables did not change in significance 
when they were included separately instead of together, indicating that the results in section 
5.1.3 are robust. However, when including only interaction terms for the gravity variables, i.e. 
distance, host and investor GDP, the results proved significant for the interaction terms as 
well as all the explanatory variables apart from the institutional variable Law. This lends 
further support to the conclusion discussed in section 5.1.3, that China follows predicted 
gravity model behavior in its FDI, whereas the G7 countries do not. In general, the loss of 
significance in these variables as more interaction terms are included might be due to 
multicollinearity issues. 
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Finally, as briefly discussed in section 3.1, linkages, and so called learning-by-doing, has been 
hypothesized as an important motive for FDI behavior in theoretical literature. This is not 
something that has been discussed at length in this thesis, or specifically included in the 
regressions. While learning from foreign investors might indeed be important for the host 
economies, it is unlikely that this would be the primary purpose of the investing G7 or 
Chinese firms in Africa, since these investors are generally more ‘advanced’ than the host 
economies. Similarly, there is always a positive bias to keep in mind when discussing SSA as 
a region, since the ‘worst’ countries in the region are naturally the ones where data is missing. 
 
6.0 Conclusions  
The purpose of this thesis was to examine if Chinese investor behavior in SSA differs from 
the behavior of other investor countries. To be able to answer this question, both general FDI 
theory as well as real life empirical descriptions of present day and historic FDI were used as 
a starting point to be able to understand the arguments in the current debate and perceived 
controversy surrounding China’s investments in SSA, and moreover, to distinguish what 
factors that actually determine Chinese FDI flows to SSA. In chapter two and three, factors 
that are commonly labeled as push and pull factors, which are believed to affect FDI 
behavior, were identified and discussed in the context of Chinese investments in SSA. In 
order to empirically examine Chinese investor behavior in SSA, both a gravity model and a 
‘regular’ OLS model were used to regress four main variables on FDI flows, where these 
variables were derived from four of the different pull factors identified in the preceding 
chapters. The four variables that the empirical analysis focuses on were chosen to capture 
effects on FDI of market size, wage level or general level of development, abundance of 
natural resources, and quality of institutions in the SSA host country. In addition, an 
interaction variable between natural resources and institutions was included in the extension 
of the model, and a variable for distance and investor country GDP was used in the 
subsequent gravity model. These four independent variables are all commonly discussed in 
relation to Chinese FDI in SSA as well as in general FDI theory, which is why they were 
chosen as main focus of the analysis. Moreover, several other variables and alternative 
approaches were tested in the robustness section. The robustness tests were performed in 
order to assure accurate results, and thereby assure a sufficient level of reliability in all 
subsequent interpretations and conclusions. 
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As in much of the existing research on similar FDI topics, the results from the empirical 
analysis in this thesis are ambiguous. Following the results of Model 1a, what is found is that 
Chinese investors may be driven by resource seeking motives to a greater extent than 
investors from the G7 countries, but also that both China and the G7 countries are driven by 
market seeking FDI motives in many of the emerging economies in SSA. Moreover, the 
results do not provide any solid evidence supporting the claim that China care less about host 
country institutional environments or take advantage of cheap labor, as argued by some critics 
of Chinese FDI in SSA. After extending this model by including an interaction variable 
between quality of institutions and natural resources, the obtained results of Model 1b suggest 
that Chinese investors might be drawn to countries with bad institutions, but also that Chinese 
investors seek to acquire natural resources primarily in countries with good institutions. These 
two implications of Model 1b are somewhat conflicting, but cannot be seen as fully reliable, 
since this model may not be sufficient due to multicollinearity issues. Moreover, the result of 
Model 2 indicates that the only discernable difference between Chinese and G7 country FDI 
behavior is the fact that Chinese FDI increases with Chinese GDP, as opposed to the G7 
countries. Hence, China is actually following the type of behavior that is predicted in an 
economic gravity model of FDI. Investors from G7 countries do not follow the standard 
predictions of the gravity model, since these G7 countries do not invest as much in SSA as 
would be expected judging from the size of their GDPs. This implication from the gravity 
model can be linked to what is discussed in the introduction of this thesis, about the fact that 
SSA traditionally has received modest amounts of FDI and lagged behind other developing 
countries in receiving FDI, but that China despite this overall tendency has become an 
influential investor in this previously neglected region. Further, the fact that China might be 
more engaged in SSA FDI can also be linked to what was discussed in section 2.3, about 
China being characterized by more influential domestic push factors, such as rapid economic 
growth and government encouragement. Finally, as discussed briefly in section 5.1.3, it is 
possible that China as a new investor is following the more traditional determinants for FDI 
predicted by the gravity model. Meanwhile, the G7 countries’ FDI behavior may be 
determined by factors other than distance or economic size, due to decreased costs of 
transportation and communications, but also the benefits of ‘new’ advantages discussed in 
section 3.1 and 5.2, such as linkages, agglomeration effects et cetera. 
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Returning to the results of Model 1a, in which the results actually pointed towards one area in 
which Chinese FDI behavior differ from the G7 country behavior, seen in the different 
significance levels of the Natural resources variable. This does suggest that China is interested 
in investing in natural resources in SSA, and that this motive for FDI is more salient for 
Chinese investors than for investors from the G7 countries. The significance of the Natural 
resource variable is not surprising, since SSA over a long period of time has been a 
destination for resource seeking FDI. The fact that the G7 countries did not have significant 
results in this variable is perhaps more remarkable. However, the Chinese focus on natural 
resources may be linked to the rapid economic growth in China, together with the entailing 
concern that the country might not be endowed with enough natural resources to manage the 
growing demand (Cheung and Qian, 2009, p. 330; Zafar, 2007, pp. 104-105). As Chinese 
investors are mainly state-owned (as mentioned in section 2.3) the attraction to natural 
resources may also reflect the Chinese government’s concerns for the country’s growing need 
of such resources more than individual firm decisions. 
 
The other significant variable in Model 1a is the host country GDP variable that serves as a 
proxy for host country market size and/or the condition of the host country market. The fact 
that host country market size is significant for both China and the G7 countries may not only 
say something about these investors’ motives for FDI, but also indicates something about 
SSA—a region in which many countries have started to emerge as new participants in global 
markets. Large host country markets, or just large host countries per se, may also mean that 
agglomeration effects have something to do with FDI decisions regarding these SSA 
countries, since it should theoretically be easier to invest in a country that already has a 
certain amount of FDI inflows from a given country or sector. Large countries, or countries 
with large markets, may also be politically important, which could matter in the case of the 
state-owned Chinese investors. 
 
More than interpreting the results of the empirical analysis of recent Chinese FDI inflows to 
SSA, it must also be asked what implications these results have in the SSA countries, as well 
as their implications for the future of FDI in this region. To begin with implications in SSA 
today, benefits of FDI are, as mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, highly dependent on 
the existence of functioning policy frameworks in the host countries, and on whether these 
frameworks are designed for directing FDI inflows to foster financial stability, promote 
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economic growth, and eventually increase the countries’ overall level of well-being. Since the 
SSA countries in this analysis generally have very low scores on indices such as rule of law, it 
might be questioned if some of these countries currently have existing policy frameworks 
designed to not only promote economic growth, but rather, promote an inclusive type of 
economic growth that benefits all parts and layers of a given society. Since results of the 
empirical analysis in this thesis suggest that Chinese investments are more focused on 
acquiring natural resources, it might be the case that this fraction of Chinese FDI is not 
beneficial for the host countries due to the fact that resource seeking FDI is believed to often 
entail costs in the form of rent seeking, and by reinforcing the power of corrupt elites. 
Furthermore, resource seeking FDI may lead to an intensified industrial focus on natural 
resources in the host country, which can lead to both deindustrialization of other sectors as 
well as deagriculturalization (Zafar, 2007, p. 108). This in turn, can make the host countries’ 
economies too dependent on the given natural resource—resulting in what in economic 
literature is known as ‘the Dutch disease’. Moreover, the fact that Chinese investors are 
known to import a considerable amount of Chinese labor, may also prevent the benefits of 
foreign investments from spreading in the host countries’ economies (Zafar, 2007, pp. 106-
107, 124; Feenstra, 2004, p. 20). To conclude the discussion of present day implications in 
SSA, an important fact that must be considered is that FDI inflows have both benefits and 
costs (Ajayi, 2006, p. 2), and it is not guaranteed that the benefits in a given SSA country will 
exceed the costs of Chinese FDI as long as the existing policy frameworks are not designed to 
channel the inflows of capital to fostering an inclusive as well as sustainable type of economic 
growth.  
 
Regarding the future of Chinese FDI in SSA, these flows are not expected to decline, part as a 
result of the agglomeration effect described in section 3.1 as well as in the robustness 
discussion in section 5.2. Drawing on the results of China’s focus on natural resource seeking 
motives, a continuation of Chinese investments in the commodity sectors in SSA is not 
unlikely. The question of whether such FDI will benefit the SSA region as a whole is as 
previously mentioned both a question of defining what the term beneficial actually means, as 
well as a question depending on the condition of political and economic frameworks in the 
host countries. However, a commodity boom would lead to capital inflows, which could 
increase macroeconomic stability—something that could attract more investors, perhaps also 
in other sectors. Thus, even though much Chinese FDI is directed towards natural resource 
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industries and might not be sustainable or long term, as discussed in section 2.4.1, such a 
short term economic boost from the commodity industry could perhaps attract more and 
different types of FDI, for example due to the previously mentioned possibility of 
agglomeration effects. 
 
However, as mentioned in section 2.1 and 3.1, FDI flows are in general very sensitive to 
exogenous factors, and this is obviously the case with Chinese FDI in SSA as well. Therefore, 
financial crises, natural disasters, or any other exogenous events that cannot be controlled for 
can certainly affect the current positive trend in SSA. Moreover, any new or alternated 
multilateral, bilateral and/or regional trade agreements may also affect general FDI flows, and 
so does specific countries’ trade policies, for example in line with the predictions of the 
concentration-proximity hypothesis mentioned in section 3.1. Exogenous factors like the ones 
mentioned here, can therefore change the relative importance of the push and pull factors 
discussed in this thesis, by for example making previously significant pull factors less 
attractive for investors, or making previously non-significant pull factors increasingly 
important in the FDI decisions of Chinese investors. 
 
Also, as mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, SSA is by many investors still perceived 
as risky, so changing this image might result in substantial positive effects, not only on 
Chinese FDI inflows, but on overall foreign capital inflows to the region (Ajayi, 2006, pp. 13-
21; Asiedu, 2002, p. 116). Hopefully, the above mentioned agglomeration effect may assist in 
this process. Finally, as pointed out by OECD (2008) and as mentioned above, the importance 
of political and economic frameworks being adjusted to correspond to FDI flows does matter 
for the host countries’ economies, and should hence not be undervalued. Thus, given that the 
SSA countries keep adjusting their country specific FDI frameworks, in order to become 
perceived as more ‘safe’ by foreign investors (Ajayi, 2006, p. 2), the remarkable Chinese 
economic growth may spread its effects to SSA—and contribute to promoting economic 
growth and enhance well-being in a region previously overlooked in the global economy. 
 
6.0 Further Research 
The results of this thesis naturally open up ideas for further research. The enquiry into the 
subject was of course limited by time as well as by the availability of data. Therefore an 
expansion of the scope of the econometric analysis, by bringing in more SSA countries and 
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perhaps other areas of the world into the analysis would be interesting, as would increasing 
the time span, especially with regards to FDI before and after the financial crisis of 2007-
2008. This would allow for further comparisons, and possibly in results that could allow for 
more general and definitive conclusions regarding Chinese FDI. On the other hand, a more 
detailed study on firm level or even on specific cases of Chinese FDI into SSA countries, 
perhaps into some of the major Chinese projects, using non-econometric and/or qualitative 
methods would also be interesting. An approach similar to these suggested ones would allow 
for the possibility of exploring some of the factors left out of the econometric analysis in this 
thesis. Examples of such factors are the ‘cultural’ ties or the perception of Chinese FDI in 
some of the SSA host countries, which both are briefly discussed in this thesis. 
 
Ultimately such types of econometric analyses are always highly dependent on the availability 
and precision of data. This is in turn is obviously affected by the fact that the countries in 
question are developing or recently developed countries with limited opportunities for 
extensive data collection, so at present times there will always be limitations due to data. 
However, further on into the future when the availability of data in the regions in question 
becomes better, the above suggested questions would not only be possible to examine, but 
even more comprehensive and exhaustive research could be done. 
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